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Typos — p. 233: Runstedt [= Rundstedt]; p. 233: Runstedt [= Rundstedt]
Hitler's generals by Anthony M. Ludovici The New English Weekly 33, 1948, pp. 233–234 - p. 233 - He singles out Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein as "probably the ablest of all the German generals," and this apparently was the view held about the man by most of those with whom the war was discussed "from Rundstedt downwards." It was his corps which, in France in 1940, helped to achieve the first break through, east of Amiens, and was first to reach and cross the Seine. He was also conspicuously successful in Russia and it was only the annoyance caused by his wise advice to Hitler to effect a long step-back in order to shake off the Russian pressure in 1944, that led to his being shelved. Liddell Hart's portrait of Rundstedt is also very sympathetic and we gather from its details both the impatience of the professional German soldier over Hitler's assumption of military omniscience and the dire consequences of this general's repeated and unwelcome resistance to Hitler's interference and too ambitious undertakings. General von Thoma's comments on this matter are enlightening. He said, "Hitler had not interfered in the Polish campaign, but the immense public acclaim of 'his' strategy there, and still more after the French campaign. had given him a swelled head. He had a taste for strategy and tactics, but did not understand the executive details. He often had good ideas, but he was stubborn as a rock — so that he spoilt the fulfilment of his own conceptions." When Hitler first contemplated the advance against the Allies in the West, he met with formidable resistance from the High Command. Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch and Generals Halder and Blumentritt were so resolutely opposed to the plan that the two former actually resolved that, if it were allowed to mature "they would order the German Army in the West to turn about and march on Berlin to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi régime." It was only General Fromm, the C.-in-C. Home Forces, who ultimately forced the abandonment of the idea; for Fromm persuaded them that "if the troops were ordered to turn against the régime, most of them would not obey — because they had too much trust in Hitler." Fromm's non-co-operation was due to no love for Hitler, for he disliked the régime as much as the others did. But his opposition saved them from what would probably have proved a gigantic fiasco. At all events, contrary to the Higher Command's expectations, the advance west succeeded brilliantly, and it did so, Liddell Hart declares, because of the conceptions of Erich von Manstein, who devised and advised the main stroke through the Ardennes. In justification of the doubts felt by the German Generals about the success of the advance westwards, Liddell Hart points out that, after all, "no reasonable estimate of the prospect could have reckoned that the French C.-in-C., Gamelin, would have made such an elementary blunder as to leave the hinge of his advance almost uncovered when he rushed the whole of his left-wing armies into the central plains of Belgium to meet the threat there." Perhaps, as a few cynics thought at the time, it was as well that Gamelin and Gort each received his high decoration during the "phoney" period of the war, before a shot had been fired in the west. Extraordinary, but not unexpected, facts about Hitler's admiration for England are revealed in Chapter X, and they account, as Liddell Hart suggests, for the Führer's reluctance both to pursue the English in their headlong retreat to Dunkirk and to strike decisively at England immediately afterwards. Hitler's profound regard for England and the English was manifested in other directions. But this is another and very interesting story which yet remains to he told. At all events. General Blumentritt's evidence on this matter is very staggering, and when Liddell Hart asks whether Hitler's attitude was prompted only by political ideas or "was it inspired by a deeper feeling" which reasserted itself at this crucial moment.", he seems to be hinting at the interesting story in question. He gives no sign. however, that he knows it. Even more astonishing is the fact that, immediately after the Armistice with France the Oberkommando des Herres, inspired though not run by Hitler in person, were apparently so certain that a general peace could be counted on that "Preparations for demobilization had already begun. According to the evidence gathered from the German generals, "Hitler's gamble in Russia failed because he was not bold enough." Other factors were the too high hopes built "on the belief that Stalin would be overthrown by his own people if he suffered heavy defeats," and Hitler's constant and inexpert interference with the High Command in matters of strategy. For instance, about the failure at Moscow, Runstedt declared, "It was Hitler's decision for rigid resistance that caused the danger in the first place. It would not have arisen if he had permitted a timely withdrawal.' Nor was the Stalingrad disaster very different. "The root cause of Germany's defeat," said General Tippelskirch, who in 1944 succeeded Heinrici in command of the Fourth Army in Russia, "was the way that her forces were wasted in fruitless efforts, and above all in fruitless resistance at the wrong time and place. That was due to Hitler. There was no strategy in our campaign." On the quality of the Red Army and its commanders, Field-Marshal von Kleist said to Liddell Hart, "the men were first-rate fighters from the start and we owed our success simply to superior training. They became first-rate soldiers with experience. They fought most toughly, had amazing endurance, and could carry on without most of the things other armies regarded as necessities. The Staff were quick to learn from their early defeats, and soon became highly efficient." Kleist, while discussing the Red Army's equipment, declared that the Russian T. 34 was the finest tank in the world. According to Rundstedt, no Russian generals were any good in 1941. A captured Russian officer is said to have told Rundstedt that Budenny "is a man with a very large moustache, and a very small brain." "In later years," Runstedt added, "there is no doubt of the improvement in their [the Russian] generalship. Zhukov was very good." In General Dittmar's opinion Zhukov was outstanding; for, although Koniev was a good and clever tactician he was not on the same level. Strange to say, Hitler and Rommel appear to have been alone in expecting the Anglo-American landings in 1944 to be in Normandy. Finally, regarding the quality of the German troops, whereas Blumentritt thought "they did not stand artillery fire as well as our troops had done in the last war," and "The German infantry of this war were not as good as in 1914–18," General Elfeldt expressed the view that the *Cassell and Co., Ltd. Crn. 8vo. pp. 311. Price 10/6d. net. It is quite impossible, by means of short extracts, however carefully selected, to give an adequate idea of the great interest of this latest of Captain Liddell Hart's military treatises. It can only be hoped that enough has been quoted to convey the immense historical value and therefore importance of the book. For, in regard to World War II, we are, owing to the questionable procedure at Nüremburg and the still more questionable executions that followed it, most likely to be deprived of much of the kind of first-hand and authoritative material about "the Other Side of the Hill" which in World War I came to us as a matter of course. Nor are future historians likely to view this loss, as well as the circumstances which caused it, with much patience. Such works as this present treatise by Captain Liddell Hart will, therefore, have to fill the gap in our documentation. And if to those rare but sane students of history and human affairs, who have always been guided by the principle "qui n'entend qu'une cloche n'entend qu un son," the book under review may, as a stop-gap, seem lamentably short, it will at least go some way to repair the errors that have been committed. Besides, such students will probably hope that it may soon either be very much extended and reissued, or else that it may be followed by supplementary volumes consisting of much more material of the same kind. It was certainly in this hope that I closed the book. |
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